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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the various challenges facing European integration 
and the EU institutional architecture as result of the global financial crisis. The European 
integration process is not yet complete, both in terms of its content and geographical 
coverage. It can be viewed as a kind of intermediate hybrid between an international 
organization and a federation, subject to further evolution. This is also true of the Single 
European Market and the Economic and Monetary Union, which form the core of the EU 
economic architecture. Certain policy prerogatives (such as external trade, competition, and 
the Common Agriculture Policy) are delegated to the supranational level while others (such 
as financial supervision or fiscal policy) remain largely in the hands of national authorities.  
 
The EU’s limited fiscal capacity has proven to be the most critical constraint in being able to 
respond to the crisis in a proper and well coordinated manner at the Union level. The EU 
budget is limited to 1% of its GDP and finances only specific policies. The EU cannot borrow 
or provide credit guarantees. There are several obstacles to coordinating national fiscal 
policies, which are both of an economic and institutional-political character. So the possibility 
of implementing a joint fiscal intervention, even for such emergency tasks as rescuing the 
pan-European financial institutions or member countries in distress, is very limited. These 
limitations have often led to the nationalization of the fiscal response, including offering 
emergency rescue packages to troubled financial institutions or non-financial corporations 
which. This, in turn, has often led to “economic nationalism,” which undermines the basic 
principles of the Single European Market.  
 
The distressed financial markets also test the macroeconomic coherence of the EU and 
EMU, placing pressure on those countries which are considered financially fragile or 
potentially insolvent. They face surging risk premia, capital outflow, depreciating currencies, 
and sovereign borrowing constraints. Again, the EU does not have enough fiscal resources 
to provide rescue packages, and an increasing number of member-states must apply for IMF 
assistance.  
 
The best solution would be to increase, at least temporarily, the EU fiscal potential. This 
would allow providing rescue packages to both troubled financial institutions and member 
states in a coordinated way. In addition, the EU must act to complete the lacking elements of 
the Single European market architecture (such as European financial supervision) and help 
in strengthening global policy and regulatory coordination.  
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1. Introduction 
 
When the US subprime mortgage crisis erupted in the summer of 2007, few people expected 
that it could affect the entire world economy so quickly and so drastically. One year later, 
there was no doubt that we were facing a financial crisis on a global scale with dramatic 
macroeconomic and social consequences for many regions and countries. This includes the 
entire European Union, its main trade and financial partners (the US, Japan, China, India and 
other Asian economies) and the countries in its closest neighborhood (CIS, Middle East and 
Africa). The global financial crisis has also brought new challenges to European integration 
and the EU institutional architecture. The EU integration project, which has been progressing 
successfully for more than half of century, is now facing what is likely to be the most serious 
sustainability test in its history. In particular, this relates to such crucial components as the 
Single European Market and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The roots of the 
tensions that have appeared since the late summer of 2008 can be attributed to the 
incomplete nature of the EU project and its various asymmetries. Generally speaking, 
economic integration has advanced much faster than political integration. More specifically, 
fiscal capacity at the Union level, which is crucial for responding to the crisis, is very limited, 
and the coordination of national fiscal policies and policy interventions involving national 
budgets has met numerous obstacles.  
 
This paper’s main objective is to provide an early attempt to analyze the challenges 
mentioned above in various policy spheres, with special attention given to fiscal constraints 
in conducting effective joint crisis management at the EU level
1
. Where possible, I suggest 
policy responses or at least the direction they should take.  
 
Before describing the potential repercussions and lessons for European integration from the 
crisis, I will provide a short analysis of the nature of the crisis and its causes (Section 2) as 
well as a short historical retrospective of the European integration process in order to 
understand its institutional asymmetries and limitations (Section 3). This will be followed by 
Section 4, which contains an overview of the potential challenges and policy traps which the 
                                                 
1
 This is revised and extended version of the paper presented at the 67th International Atlantic Economic 
Conference, Rome, March 12-14, 2009. While I would like to thank Dr. Hubert Gabrisch from the Halle Institute for 
Economic Research for his critical and constructive comments to the earlier draft I take a sole responsibility for 
paper’s content and quality.  
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crisis’ development and its management has revealed so far in Europe. Section 5 discusses 
challenges in the fiscal policy sphere and the role of the EU budget, which seem to be crucial 
for the EU’s ability to address various, often unpredictable, crisis challenges. Section 6 
focuses on questions related to the future architecture of financial supervision, especially in 
its European dimension. Section 7 discusses the external policy coordination with other 
major partners under the existing and (perhaps) newly created global institutions and Section 
8 focuses on challenges facing the EU periphery. Section 9 offers a summary of conclusions 
and policy recommendations, including comments related to the EU’s general institutional 
setting.  
 
This paper is policy-oriented (with some normative analysis) and uses the analytic-narrative 
method rather than the rigid theoretical modeling or empirical analysis of past trends. I 
believe it is still too early for the former while the relevance of past trends, especially those 
illustrating macroeconomic variables and market behavior in the last decade, may be 
misleading in trying to understand current developments and forecasting for the near and 
more distant future. For the same reason, the diagnosis, conclusions and potential 
recommendations offered in this paper have a very preliminary character, and are subject to 
future verification when we learn more about the crisis and its potential impact on the global 
and European economy.  
 
2. Characteristics of the crisis  
 
The crisis erupted at the core of the world economy, i.e. in the US-based transnational 
financial institutions (in the summer of 2007) and spread quickly beyond the US, first to other 
developed economies (in the first half of 2008), and then to emerging markets (in the second 
half of 2008 and early 2009). This makes its dynamics and the direction of spillover similar to 
the Great Depression of 1929-1933 and the 1972 US dollar crisis (which moved from the 
center to periphery). The movement is the opposite of the 1997-1999 series of emerging 
market crises, which started at the periphery but then moved to the center, affecting some 
global financial institutions, which were excessively exposed to the crisis-affected 
economies.  
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Figure 1: Case-Schiller House Price Index in the US (in real terms) 
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Source: Schiller (2000) and subsequent updates, http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/Fig2-1.xls  
 
The current global financial crisis was preceded and caused by an overheating of the world 
economy, which led, among other things, to the build up and subsequent burst of several 
assets bubbles (see e.g. Roach, 2009). Figures 1-3 illustrate the three most important assets 
bubbles which resulted from a buildup in:  
1. The housing and commercial property market in the US and several European 
countries such as Ireland, UK, Iceland, Spain, Greece and Baltic countries  
2. The stock market in the US and over the world   
3. The global commodity markets starting with oil, followed by metals, agriculture 
commodities and food products 
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Figure 2: Real S&P Stock Price and Composite Earnings Indexes in the US 
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Source: Schiller (2000) and subsequent updates, http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls 
Figure 3: Primary commodity prices, including oil (deflated by US CPI), 2005=100  
 
Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices, http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/chart1.pdf 
The exact timing and dynamics of the building up and then bursting of each individual bubble 
were not the same. For example, when the housing and stock market bubbles had already 
burst in 2007, the commodity bubble continued to be built up until the summer of 2008, as it 
absorbed liquidity which fled from the former. This led Orlowski (2008) to suggest a 
phenomenon of the “wandering asset bubble”. Eventually, however, all of the bubbles burst.  
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When one takes a step back and tries to identify the factors responsible for the global 
overheating in the mid-2000s (and therefore for the subsequent crisis), the highly 
accommodative monetary policy of the US Fed and other major central banks (especially the 
Bank of Japan) comes to mind as a major scapegoat. Starting in the mid 1990s, most central 
banks in the developed world, which were enjoying record-low inflation and low inflationary 
expectations, reverted to a more intensive fine-tuning in order to avoid the smallest risk of 
recession.  
 
As a result, the Fed aggressively reduced its interest rate three times over the last 10 years 
(see Figure 4), starting with the series of crises in emerging markets (Mexico, South-East 
Asia, Asia, Russia, and Brazil) which caused the Long Term Capital Management troubles in 
the US at the end of 1998. This was followed by the 2001-2002 drastic interest rate cuts 
(which were lowered to 1%) which followed the bursting of the dotcom bubble and the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. On both occasions, the Fed provided relief to troubled financial institutions, 
helping to circumvent (1998) and reduce (2001) the danger of a US recession, while at the 
same time, fueling global economic growth. The third intervention occurred in the wake of the 
current crisis (at the end of 2007 and the beginning of 2008): the federal funding rate was 
reduced from 5.25% to 2% within a few months span and then further reduced to a record-
low of 0.15% in December 2008.  
 
Figure 4: Fed Federal Funds Effective Rate, in %, 1998-2009 
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Source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/ 
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Fearing recession and deflation (in the early 2000s)
2
, the subsequent tightening of monetary 
policy always came too late. Such an excessively lax Fed attitude contributed to a systematic 
build up of excess liquidity in both the US and around the world. The additional contribution 
came from of the somewhat mercantilist policies of several emerging-market exporters, who 
preferred to keep their exchange rates undervalued and continued to accumulate large 
international reserves, finally reaching record-high levels (as in the examples of China and 
India). The sources of such policies can be traced to both a tradition of export-led growth 
strategies conducted by the earlier generation of “Asian tigers” (from 1960s to 1980s) and 
lessons drawn from a series of emerging market currency crises in the 1990s. The IMF 
recommendations to build large precautionary foreign-exchange reserves worked in the 
same manner. At a later stage, the rapidly growing trade and fiscal surpluses of the oil-
exporting economies such as the Gulf States or Russia added to this trend.  
 
The growing volume of international reserves reflected a growing global liquidity
3
, on the one 
hand, and allowed for the balancing of the massive current account deficit of the US, on the 
other. This means that the controversy of whether the “global savings glut” (Bernanke, 2005) 
or “global liquidity glut” (see Gros et al., 2006) was responsible for the growing international 
imbalances was probably incorrectly formulated because these were, in fact, two sides of the 
same phenomenon.  
 
One of the most interesting questions is why the inflationary consequences of such super-
expansionary policies came so late and in such a relatively moderate scale? Several 
hypotheses are worth further analytical exploration.  
 
                                                 
2
 This fear was well articulated by Greenspan (2004) and his idea of a “risk management approach” to monetary 
policy.  
3
 This is perhaps the only available measure of “global liquidity” or “global money supply”. Nevertheless, both 
categories require further theoretical and statistical conceptualization before they can be used for analyzing global 
macroeconomic and financial developments.  
 
 
11
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 384 - The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for … 
 
 
Figure 5: ECB marginal lending facility, in %, 1999-2009 
 
Source: http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse 
First, the positive supply-side shocks triggered by market transformation in many developing 
and post-communist communist countries and the global trade liberalization of the 1990s 
(with some effects delayed to the first half of 2000s
4
), placed downward price pressure on 
the global manufacturing market. Second, rapidly growing international trade and financial 
transactions meant increased demand for USD and EUR as global transaction currencies. 
Third, many emerging-market economies enjoyed a rapid post-inflationary re-monetization 
backed by increasing international reserves. Finally, the above mentioned asset bubbles 
absorbed part of the excess liquidity while the increase in asset prices was not usually 
reflected by the standard inflation indicators such as CPI or PPI.  
 
In comparison with the Fed, the monetary policy of the European Central Bank was less 
expansionary, which is reflected, for example, in less dramatic interest changes in times of 
distress (see Figure 5). At the beginning of the current financial crisis, the ECB even tried to 
“lean against the wind”, increasing its basic interest rate in June 2008, against the concern of 
growing global inflationary pressure. However, its room of maneuver was always quite limited 
and determined, to a large extent, by US monetary policy decisions. And only very recently 
was the ECB able to bring the Eurozone’s inflation below the statutory ceiling of 2%.  
 
                                                 
4
 For example, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which was an important part of the 1994 GATT/WTO 
global trade liberalization agreement, entered into force only on January 1, 2005.  
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3. European integration: its institutional asymmetries and 
limitations 
 
The European integration process started with the Rome Treaty in 1957, which created the 
European Economic Community of six Western European countries. This process does not 
have any historical precedents in contemporary history. Its political aim was to put a stop, 
once and for all, to the dramatic experience of many centuries of bloody conflicts in Europe 
which culminated in two world wars, and to build the economic foundations for peace and 
prosperity on the continent. It is based on the principle of voluntarily delegating a level of 
national sovereignty to the Community/Union level.  
 
This meant that each Treaty revision aiming to either delegate new prerogatives to the 
Community/Union level or bring new countries to the “club” required the unanimous 
agreement of all member states. This was often difficult to achieve. So the integration 
process progressed step-by-step, depending on the consensus on particular issues and 
available cross-country compromises. To be able to move forward and secure unanimity, 
each time a majority had to grant outsiders/Euroskeptics concessions, including many 
exemptions and opt-outs from common rules in almost each area of EU integration. The 
EMU and Schengen zone, which do not cover all EU members, are the best examples of 
such opt-outs.  
 
As result, the EU represents a hybrid construction with many institutional asymmetries. It 
does not fall under any simple definition such as a federation, confederation or international 
organization. Integration went relatively far in the common trade policy area, and in various 
areas of regulation related to the Single European Market, Schengen area, and common 
currency (although in all these spheres, regulatory harmonization is not yet complete). On 
the contrary, in the political arena, the integration process has not advanced very far. This is 
reflected in the reluctance of member states to transfer more financial resources to the Union 
level, even in case of emergency, as is being experienced under the current crisis.  
 
Asymmetries in the integration architecture did not create serious tensions in “tranquil” times. 
This changed, however, when the European economy became exposed to the 
unprecedented series of shocks generated by the global financial crisis.  
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4. Europe’s response to the crisis: potential threats to the 
Single European market 
 
Europe’s response to the crisis came quite late and not always in a well coordinated way. In 
its first phase (until the late summer of 2008), the danger of systemic financial crisis was 
downplayed by most policymakers. The periodic liquidity squeezes on the inter-bank market 
were considered a temporary contagion effect imported from the US. The main policy 
concerns were the appreciation pressure on the Euro (generated by a depreciating US 
dollar), the weakening US demand for EU export, the continuing inflationary pressure and the 
decline of the housing market in some EU countries.  
 
The breaking point came with the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in mid-September 2008. This 
dramatic event triggered a far-reaching contagion effect on world financial markets and 
global financial disintermediation. It also revealed the many systemic weaknesses of the 
European financial institutions, whose situation did not differ so much from their US partners 
and competitors. It became apparent that European banks and other financial institutions 
were also heavily exposed to various “toxic” assets, which originated both domestically and 
were acquired in the US, and generally overleveraged.  
 
The policy responses were quite chaotic and mostly on the national level, in spite of their 
cross-border consequences. Because most of them involved either explicit or implicit fiscal 
consequences, they had to be taken by national authorities, due to the limited, in fact almost 
non-existent, fiscal capacity at the EU level. The attempt to coordinate national anti-crisis 
policies came late and was not always efficient or successful. The main factors which greatly 
complicated policy coordination were the various speeds and strengths of cross-country 
financial contagion, the uneven exposure of individual economies to shocks, the uneven 
capacity and resources to provide rescue, the sometimes hasty and nervous reactions on a 
national level and the temptation to free ride. These led to many beggar-thy-neighbor policy 
decisions and, more generally, to economic nationalism. This challenged the basic principles 
of the Single European Market, the core of the EU economic and institutional architecture.  
 
Examples of beggar-thy-neighbor policies, economic nationalism and free riding included, 
among others, cross-border competition in providing emergency deposit guarantees (initiated 
by Ireland), the Iceland-UK “war” on rescuing troubled Iceland banks and their international 
depositors (see Vives, 2009), poorly coordinated rescue packages for some transnational 
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banks which led to their break up along national lines (the Fortis example)
5
, emergency aid 
packages to some great manufacturing companies limited to national borders (the example 
of French support to car producers;  see EurActive, 2009, Feb. 10), measures discouraging 
cross-border movements of labor, various regulatory actions of financial supervision focusing 
on the liquidity and safety of individual national markets rather than the cross-border impact 
of their decisions, etc. If this trend continues, it could lead to serious disruption on the Single 
European Market in its many important segments. An even greater challenge is posed by the 
anti-crisis fiscal policies per se which are the subject of the next section.  
 
5. Strengthening EU fiscal capacity 
 
The global economic downturn has renewed interest in a counter-cyclical fiscal policy going 
well beyond the automatic fiscal stabilizers (see e.g. IMF, 2008). The idea itself is highly 
controversial and raises several reservations (see Balcerowicz & Rzonca, 2008). One 
reservation is whether a fiscal stimulus could work effectively in an environment of disrupted 
financial intermediation (one of the reasons why the monetary stimulus has had a limited 
impact). Another is the question of what will be its medium-to-long-term impact on the level of 
public debt, which is high in several countries (most of them facing additional challenges 
related to population aging). This general debate is, however, beyond the agenda of this 
paper.  
 
I would like to discuss the EU-specific challenges related to any large-scale fiscal activism, 
which are sometimes necessary in order to rescue troubled financial institutions or member 
states. As mentioned before, the EU’s own budget resources are very limited (in the range of 
1% of GDP) and are strictly targeted to support some key policies at the level of the Union, 
mainly the Common Agriculture Policy, the Cohesion Policy, R&D programs, and official 
development assistance. The only possible window of anti-cyclical policy relates to the more 
intensive, short-term use of the Cohesion Fund, structural funds and European Investment 
Bank (EIB) resources to support less developed regions, mostly in the EU new member 
states (NMS). This measure was included in the European Economic Recovery Plan 
                                                 
5
 For examples and a timeline of uncoordinated or poorly coordinated rescue attempts of financial institutions in 
the autumn of 2008, see Lanoo (2008).  
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approved by the Council of the European Union (2008) during its summit in Brussels on 
December 11-12, 2008
6
.  
 
The idea of creating additional ad hoc funds at the EU level, in order to provide rescue to 
troubled financial institutions (Gros & Micossi, 2009),
7
 has not received widespread support 
among member states. Therefore the only remaining option is coordinating the national fiscal 
stimulus packages. However, such coordination cannot be effective for several reasons:  
 
1. Fiscal decisions remain within the prerogatives of national governments and national 
parliaments. None of the EU governing bodies (the Council, European Commission 
and European Parliament) has the formal power to force a member state to 
participate in a joint fiscal stimulus package and deliver on given promises. In fact, 
smaller member states may face the temptation of free riding, i.e. benefiting from a 
stimulus offered by larger partners while remaining reluctant to contribute to a 
common pool.  
2. On the contrary, all EU member states are subject to limits in their fiscal deficit (3% of 
GDP) and public debt (60% of GDP on gross basis) imposed on them by the Treaty 
and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). As most of the countries have run cyclically 
adjusted deficits over the last decade, they do not have much, if any, room for 
countercyclical fiscal policy. So it was not surprising when shortly after agreeing on 
an EU-wide fiscal stimulus package, the Commission initiated the “excessive deficit” 
procedure against six member states (France, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Malta and 
Spain)
8
, which had breached the 3% of GDP deficit ceiling in 2008 and which 
appeared likely to have expanding deficits in 2009 and 2010. Looking ahead, this kind 
of schizophrenia will not enhance the credibility of any voluntarily agreed upon fiscal-
stimulus package. Rather, it further undermines EU fiscal surveillance rules and thus 
has hardly built a culture of fiscal constraints on national level.  
3. In addition, at the start of the current crisis, individual EU member states started to 
face highly uneven public borrowing constraints determined by many factors, the 
fiscal prudence past track record probably being the most important one. The 
atmosphere of collective safety provided by a common currency in the first ten years 
                                                 
6
 However, its implementation may face several obstacles. So far, the absorption level of structural and cohesion 
funds in EU NMS was not particularly high due to various capacity constraints. The economic downturn can 
additionally decrease the available pool of economically effective projects and the domestic sources of their co-
financing.  
7
 A similar idea was offered by the Government of France at the end of September 2008; see EurActive (2008, 
Oct.2).  
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of its existence is gone (probably for good). To address this issue the long discussed 
idea of common Eurozone bonds (e.g. Giovannini et al., 2000) became a policy 
interest again (EurActive, 2008, Sept. 25; 2009, Feb. 18). However it has little chance 
of being approved both by EMU countries with a lower risk rating (who are reluctant 
to pay more for their treasury securities when the risk will be shared at the EMU level) 
and those member states which remain outside the Eurozone (who are afraid of 
being crowded out from the sovereign debt market – see below).  
4. Borrowing constraints are of particular concern for those EU member states 
(especially among the NMS) which remain outside the Eurozone. Neither the EU nor 
even EMU membership is considered an effective insurance against sovereign 
default by financial markets. As a result, the room for fiscal maneuver for at least half 
of the member states is also highly limited for this reason.  
5. Furthermore, even if one assumes that for the reasons elaborated in the three 
previous paragraphs that the national contributions to a joint fiscal stimulus package 
must remain asymmetric, (i.e. mostly provided by countries which have room for 
maneuver under the SGP and lower borrowing costs, which does not seem likely for 
domestic political economy reasons – see below), this could cause a further crowding 
out of resources available for countries with poorer credit ratings.  
6. Because of the expected lack of solidarity in fiscal stimulation
9
 caused by the above 
mentioned policy and institutional constraints, the national fiscal stimulus packages 
will be maximally targeted to domestic economies and will disregard potential adverse 
cross-border effects. This can be easily understood from a political economy point of 
view. If a government wants to spend more of its taxpayers’ money (most likely at the 
cost of burdening future generations of citizens with additional debt), why should the 
benefits of such policies be shared with other nations? This is the main source of 
“economic nationalism” which may seriously undermine the Single European Market 
and trigger a dangerous wave of a new kind of protectionism worldwide.  
 
Regardless of the debate on whether or not countercyclical fiscal policy makes sense at all, 
and if so, to which extent and in which concrete forms, the current crisis has made clear that 
increasing the fiscal capacity at the Union level is of critical importance. At the very least, this 
                                                                                                                                                        
8
 In addition to the ongoing excessive deficit procedure against Hungary and UK - see 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/sg_pact_fiscal_policy/excessive_deficit9109_en.htm.  
9
 Saha and von Weizsacker (2009) estimate that the expected discretionary loosening of fiscal policy by individual 
member states in 2009 will be highly uneven, ranging from nil (in the cases of Denmark, Ireland and Italy) to 
almost 6% of GDP (in the case of Spain). A similar picture is provided by Prasad & Sorkin (2009) in respect to the 
G-20 countries.   
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would help member states to avoid implementing beggar-thy-neighbor policies, various forms 
of “economic nationalism” and free riding.  
 
First, the lesson taught by the Great Depression is that public authorities must step down in 
large-scale financial crises to avoid a systemic banking crisis and the total collapse of the 
financial system, and the resulting deep recession spiral
10
. While private sector and market-
oriented solutions should always be given priority, injecting public money is often 
unavoidable, at least temporarily. If this could be done at the EU level, it would help in 
avoiding the breakup of transnational financial institutions along national boundaries, 
distorting the European financial market, breaching the single European competition policy, 
moving speculative pressures from one country to another and forcing some member 
countries to act beyond their financial means (as in the case of deposit guarantees - see 
Vives, 2009).  
 
Second, as recent experience demonstrates, some EU member states may require external 
financial support to either resist speculative attacks against their currencies or sovereign debt 
default, or both. The EU should independently be able to provide this support, rather than 
only being able to do it by coordinating the support of individual member states or by backing 
IMF programs.  
 
Even such a limited agenda requires more fiscal resources than are currently available under 
the EU budget framework. However, in order to increase fiscal capacity at the Union level, 
further changes in EU treaties, going beyond the Lisbon Treaty (which is still awaiting 
ratification), will be required
11
. Any substantial increase in the size of the EU budget will have 
not only fiscal implications on a national level (increasing the size of the national contribution 
to the EU’s budget and additional revenue sources at the Union level) but is also likely to 
have far-reaching implications for Europe’s political architecture (increased federalism, with 
more power given to the European Parliament and weakening the veto power of member 
states).  
 
                                                 
10
 The very nature of the fractional banking/financial system – the high level of leverage and time mismatch 
between assets and liabilities (borrowing short in order to lend long) makes the entire financial system extremely 
vulnerable in times of distress and crises in confidence. The collapse of one large bank or investment fund may 
cause a far-reaching chain reaction as experienced recently after the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers. 
11
 Before this happens, one can imagine building ad hoc emergency funds.  
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6. Building the single European financial market and rescuing 
the European financial sector 
 
Monetary, or more broadly, macroeconomic policy, is not the sole scapegoat when one 
analyzes the roots of the current crisis. Regulations and regulatory institutions that remained 
well behind rapid financial market developments also played a role. Two major 
inconsistencies are particularly apparent when looking at institutional issues:  
 
♦ The global character of financial markets and the transnational character of major 
financial institutions as opposed to the national mandate of financial supervisions. 
This inconsistency can be observed at the European level as well: the Single 
European Market of financial services does not have any kind of financial supervision 
authority at the EU level (see analysis of Veron, 2007; Vives, 2009).  
♦ The increasing role of financial conglomerates operating in various sectors of the 
finance industry and the innovative, cross-sectoral financial instruments versus the 
sectoral segmentation of financial supervision; only a few countries can allege 
consolidated financial supervision. The US presents additional institutional 
peculiarities with two levels of responsibilities (federal and state) for financial 
supervision.  
 
Some blame should also be borne by the rating agencies and supervisory authorities that 
failed to understand the nature of the innovative financial instruments which provided 
excessively short-sighted risk assessment by not sufficiently taking the actual risk distribution 
in the long intermediation chain between the final borrower and creditor into account, thus 
underestimating the actual risk
12
. The same rating agencies which gave financial institutions 
and individual financial instruments excessively positive grades during the boom started to 
hastily downgrade their ratings in times of distress, which added to market panic.  
 
Precautionary regulations, usually meant to enhance the safety and credibility of financial 
institutions such as capital-adequacy ratios (especially when assets are risk-weighted and 
liabilities mark-to market priced) or tight accounting standards related to reserve provisions 
against expected losses, also unveiled their perverse effect as they led to sudden credit 
stops and massive fire selling of assets. They proved be strongly pro-cyclical (with Basel-2 
                                                 
12
 See Soros’ (2009a) comments on the wrong perception and the resulting inaccurate risk assessment of the 
credit default swaps (CDS).  
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being even more pro-cyclical than Basel-1), especially after the crisis had already erupted 
(see Goodhart, 2009).  
 
Finally, the incentive systems under which many financial institutions and their management 
operated led to shortening their analytical and decision-making horizons and serious 
distortions in adopted business strategies. Some popular topics discussed recently in the 
media such as the aggressive system of bonuses linked to short-term paper profits, the large 
redundancy packages for top management (even if they are evidently failing) or the 
remuneration of rating agencies by clients whom they evaluate are only the tip of the iceberg.  
 
In the thematic context of this paper, the most important question relates to potential EU 
institutional and policy responses to the systemic inconsistencies mentioned above.  
 
As previously noted, the EU does not have the fiscal capacity to conduct rescue operations 
for the troubled transnational financial institutions. This forces the institutions to seek support 
at the national level with the risk of refocusing their business back to individual national 
markets. This dilemma is unlikely to be resolved without far-reaching changes to the Treaty.  
 
The situation is a bit simpler with European financial market regulations and supervision, at 
least in terms of the Treaty. These competencies are potentially within the Single European 
Market mandate delegated to the level of authority of the Union and can be regulated by the 
Council through a qualified majority voting. However, there is a lot of resistance to pan-
European supervision on a national level, especially in countries where the financial industry 
plays a substantial role (such as the UK). Some of the arguments sound legitimate: as long 
as national budgets are responsible for providing rescue operations, supervisory power 
cannot be delegated to a supra-national body (see Goodhart, 2009).  
 
The recently released report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision appointed by 
the President of the European Commission (De Larosiere et al., 2009) attempts to address 
many of the regulatory and systemic flaws in a comprehensive manner, both at the European 
and global levels. It offers several recommendations aimed at harmonizing and strengthening 
the European regulatory standards, not only in respect to “mainstream” financial institutions 
such as banks or insurance companies, but also to investment and hedge funds. It also calls 
for setting up a new body called the European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC), which 
“...should be composed of the members of the General Council of the ECB, the chairpersons 
of CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR as well as one representative of the European Commission” 
and chaired by the ECB President. The role of ESRC would be to pool and analyze 
 
 
20
CASE Network Studies & Analyses No. 384 - The Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for … 
 
 
macroeconomic information related to financial stability. When appropriate, the ESRC would 
issue macro-prudential risk warnings to respective decision-making and supervisory bodies.  
 
In respect to an institutional architecture of financial supervision, the Larosiere Report seems 
to offer a half-way solution in comparison to the earlier expert-type proposals (see e.g. 
Lanoo, 2008). The report suggests creating a set of coordinating bodies at the EU level while 
retaining most of the prerogatives of national authorities in the day-to-day operational 
supervision. More specifically, it recommends setting up a European System of Financial 
Supervisors (ESPS) involving three European supervisory bodies (in the banking sector, the 
insurance industry and the securities market) which would coordinate national supervisors. In 
addition, colleges of supervisors would be set up for all major cross-border financial 
institutions. It also suggests a four-year transition period to make the proposed reform 
operational.  
 
The Larosiere Report is justly criticized for the slow proposed pace of creating the ESPS, the 
limited powers this body would have, keeping the three sectoral supervisions separate, 
separating macro (ESRC) and micro supervision (ESPS) and the lack of bail out facilities at 
the EU level (see Lanoo, 2009; Vives, 2009).  
 
However, it remains to be seen whether even a modified version of the Larosiere 
recommendations will receive sufficient support from member states in order to be translated 
into concrete decisions and binding regulations. The stakes are very high: if the EU member 
states fail to agree on building a pan-European financial supervisory authority, there will have 
to be greater control over transnational corporations in each host country (as predicted by 
Goodhart, 2009) which could translate to more beggar-thy-neighbor policies in the future.  
 
7. The EU role in addressing global macroeconomic and fiscal 
challenges 
 
As mentioned earlier, the crisis is truly global in character, so the policy response should also 
be global. Even the most comprehensive and adequate decisions within the EU (which is, 
unfortunately, not always the case as argued in the previous sections) would remain 
ineffective without broader policy coordination with the other major players. Furthermore, as 
one of the economic superpowers, the EU bears a special responsibility for global crisis 
management.  
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In the thematic context of this paper, I will concentrate on highlighting key issues and policy 
dilemmas facing the EU as a global player:  
 
1. The urgent task of overhauling financial regulations and financial supervision 
discussed in the previous section cannot be limited to EU jurisdiction. Many important 
questions such as revising the Basel prudential regulations (reducing their pro-
cyclicality) and accounting standards, imposing a regulatory corset on hedge and 
investment funds, correcting the role of credit rating agencies, fighting tax and 
regulatory havens, regulating and supervising global financial conglomerates, and 
monitoring macroeconomic and macro-prudential risks require close cooperation at 
least within the OECD “club.” Bringing key emerging market players on board would 
also be highly recommended. The De Larosiere report highlights the importance of 
global coordination on these issues and actively offers several interesting ideas in 
respect to both the content of global financial regulations and their institutional 
setting.  
2. The same concerns the global coordination of macroeconomic policies. While political 
realism prevents us from considering a global economic government, a global 
currency or a global central bank,
13
 increasing dialogue, consultation and policy 
coordination on a global level is both possible and desirable. The EU can take the 
lead in pursuing such a process, drawing on its own integration experience as a 
reference. One can also imagine authorizing the IMF to issue additional liquidity in the 
form of SDR to provide emergency support to countries in distress (see Soros, 
2009b). This could disentangle, to a certain extent, the management of global liquidity 
from the monetary policies of the largest central banks such as the Fed or the ECB. 
The question remains regarding what would be the market acceptance of SDR, if it 
were issued in large amounts.  
3. In the context of the two previous paragraphs, strengthening the IMF’s role seems to 
be extremely important. The “gold” era of economic growth in the early and mid 
2000s and the unique calm on global financial markets (which in retrospect was 
probably indicative of the silence before the storm) drastically decreased the demand 
for IMF lending and led to its institutional downsizing. This unfortunate trend must be 
now rapidly reversed and the IMF mandate should be amended and strengthened. 
Apart from country-targeted macroeconomic rescue programs and macroeconomic 
and financial surveillance, this institution should play a much greater role in 
monitoring global risks and providing a technical platform for global policy dialogue 
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and coordination. However, this brings back the issue of the IMF’s institutional 
structure, and especially the redistribution of voting power between developed and 
developing countries (in favor of the latter) to enhance its legitimacy. The EU could 
play a crucial role here in many respects. First, it could give up part of its voting 
power in favor of developing nations and reduce its number of seats on the Executive 
Board. This could be done by consolidating the EU country quotas and EU countries’ 
representation into a single constituency, a move which was already suggested a 
long time ago (e.g. Fischer, 2006). Second, it could give up its informal “monopoly” on 
nominating the IMF Managing Director, again in favor of one of the developing 
nations. Third, it could actively contribute to the recapitalization of the IMF and to 
increasing its lending capacity. The decisions taken by the European Council on 
March 19-20, 2009 seem to be moving in this direction, at least in relation to the first 
and third proposal (Council of the European Union, 2009, Annex 1, paragraphs (viii) 
and (ix), p. 15).  
4. The EU could also play a leading role in bringing the stalled global trade negotiations 
(the so-called Doha round) to a successful outcome (as declared at the G-20 meeting 
in Washington DC in November 2008). This would be an important anti-protectionist 
message to the entire world economy and a bold policy measure which would help 
stop the global recession. Such a mission would probably require more flexibility on 
the EU side in respect to agriculture trade.  
5. The EU must also continue its role as the largest provider of development assistance 
to lower-income countries. This is even more important now than a few years ago 
because the global economic downturn and the sudden stop in private capital flows 
have severely strained developing economies.  
 
8. Challenges to the EU periphery 
 
The crisis developments have made clear that financial markets are not going to continue to 
consider the EU as a homogenous area which is immune to adverse and country-specific 
macroeconomic and financial shocks. On the contrary, despite its origins in the US and the 
richest EU countries, the financial crisis affected the EU periphery more adversely than its 
core. The rapidly declining stock markets, increasing risk premia for both sovereign and 
private borrowing, declining currencies (especially in countries which run flexible exchange 
rate regimes) and sometimes also banking sector troubles (in the cases of Hungary and 
                                                                                                                                                        
13
 However, a lot would depend on the readiness of the largest central banks to accept SDR as a reserve 
currency.  
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Latvia) are the phenomena which the governments and monetary authorities of the EU NMS, 
EU candidates and EU neighboring countries have been facing since the summer of 2008.  
 
To provide a correct diagnosis, a broad notion of EU “periphery” requires certain 
disaggregation. One could say there are three tiers of EU peripheries:  
1. Certain EMU countries (especially in the Northern Mediterranean region) with weaker 
macroeconomic fundamentals, especially in the public finance sphere 
2. Those NMS which do not belong to the EMU yet 
3. EU actual and potential candidates, members of the EEA, and key EU European 
neighbors 
The main problem of the first group is their high risk premia and, therefore, high spreads for 
government bonds (when compared with yields on bonds issued by Germany and other 
countries considered to be the EMU “core” – see Figure 6), a phenomenon which was not 
observed in the first ten years of the Eurozone’s existence. This signals a possibility that 
financial markets can further test fiscal solidarity within the EMU, i.e. the readiness of the 
core to provide a bailout to the troubled periphery, in order to avoid the precedent of 
sovereign default within the Eurozone. Looking ahead, however, higher spreads in respect to 
poor fiscal performers can offer an additional disciplining mechanism on top of a rather soft 
and partly diluted SGP (see Dabrowski, Antczak & Gorzelak, 2006).  
Figure 6: Government Bond Spreads over German Bund in some EMU countries  
 
Source: EU10 (2009), p.6 
The variety of potential risks is much broader in the second and third groups. The risks 
include exchange rate and other financial and macroeconomic risks related to exchange rate 
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volatility, i.e. the risk of currency mismatches in the corporate and financial sectors and 
general government finances, which may result in their insolvency. With shrinking global 
liquidity and increasing risk aversion (especially after the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy), 
these two groups of countries have become the subject of intense market pressure (see 
Figures 7-8) and resulting capital outflow.  
Figure 7: NMS Exchange Rates against the Euro (Jan. 2008 = 100)  
 
Source: EU10 (2009), p. 8 
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Figure 8: Euro Emerging Market Bond Index Global (EMBIG) Spreads 
 
Note: The difference between the yield on each bond and a Euro government yield of the same maturity, duration 
weighted.  
Source: EU10 (2009), p. 8 
This proved to be a drastic change in comparison with the previous 7-8 years when this part 
of the world enjoyed the reputation of being a safe “haven”. In particular, this related to the 
EU NMS (the second group), where risk premia were below those of other emerging markets 
(Luengnaruemitchai & Schadler, 2007). However, starting in the second half of 2008, the 
situation changed dramatically. Three NMS (Hungary, Latvia and Romania) have already 
had to resort to using IMF-led international rescue packages. The remaining countries are 
struggling to avoid a similar scenario, which would be considered a serious blow to their 
reputations. It appears that financial markets have revised their previous overly optimistic 
assessment of this region and they are not ready to continue considering EU membership 
itself (without joining the EMU) as a firm insurance against a financial crisis. Also, the 
unilateral peg to the Euro, even in the form of long- and well-functioning currency boards as 
in the cases of Estonia, Bulgaria and Lithuania is not considered as a fully credible 
mechanism by financial markets any longer.  
 
The analysis of macroeconomic developments in the NMS after their accession to the EU is 
beyond the agenda of this paper. However, one should mention the widespread “reform 
fatigue” experienced by these countries after a decade of intensive transition- and EU-
accession-related modernization efforts, their reluctance to correct deep fiscal imbalances 
(Hungary and Poland) and their inability to contain excessive private credit expansion (the 
case of the Baltic states). In a sense, the NMS became the victims of their own success and 
the post-Enlargement euphoria (both global and regional) of private investors, researchers 
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and analysts, national authorities and EU governing bodies, who had greatly underestimated 
the magnitude of the potential risks.  
 
Part of the above story relates to the slow pace of EMU enlargement, a process which 
encountered several obstacles on both the incumbent and candidate sides. Politically, the 
incumbents are in no hurry to admit the new member states to the “inner” club, as this allows 
the incumbents to maintain a “carrot” which can be given or withheld from the NMS 
depending on their behavior. The incumbents’ economic fears were mostly related to the 
controversial hypothesis that the accession of rapidly-growing countries would result in an 
increase in inflationary pressure and interest rates in the Eurozone, which would have an 
additional contractionary impact on the slower-growing economies of some of the 
incumbents (see Rostowski, 2006; Zoubanov, 2006).  
 
To address these fears, priority was given to those NMS with higher GDP per-capita levels, 
even if some of them (such as Cyprus and Malta) did not meet the public debt criterion. On 
the other hand, the two best performing and fiscally prudent economies (Estonia and 
Lithuania) which de facto already belonged to the Eurozone (by running Euro-denominated 
currency boards) were rejected in 2006 because they did not meet the inflation criterion (by 
0.1 percentage point in case of Lithuania). The crisis management in these two countries 
could have been made easier, if they had  been admitted to the EMU in 2006. Blocking 
Bulgaria’s application to enter the ERM2 mechanism for the last two years is another 
example of the same policy, which was meant to discourage NMS from rapidly entering into 
the EMU. This means that the EMU enlargement policy on the incumbent side was guided by 
“real convergence” criteria rather than the nominal convergence criteria as defined by the 
Treaty.  
 
The largest NMS (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) were also in no hurry 
for various reasons, including the lack of political determination to conduct fiscal adjustment, 
the euro-skeptical ideologies of major political forces and the discouraging signals from the 
incumbents. The post-enlargement euphoria and the low risk premia made the potential 
economic benefits of early Euro adoption less apparent.  
 
As a result of this double skepticism (both on the incumbent and candidate side), most of the 
NMS are now experiencing financial crises, which was the worse-case scenario predicted a 
few years ago by those who warned against the “no rush” policy (Dabrowski, 2007). Some of 
the crisis victims (such as Poland and the Baltic countries) are trying to seek a way out of the 
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current turmoil by setting a realistic EMU accession date and aiming for immediate ERM2 
accession (Poland).  
 
The third ring of periphery countries (i.e. EU actual and prospective candidates, members of 
the European Economic Area and EU neighbors in the CIS) are also experiencing a difficult 
time, with some of them (Iceland, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and 
Serbia) being forced to ask for IMF rescue and others continuing to struggle based on their 
own means (like Russia and Turkey). The potential importance of each country case 
depends on its economic potential and economic relations with the EU, on the one hand, and 
on its formal status in respect to potential EU accession, on the other. Obviously, the EU 
obligations and political interest to provide help and rescue to the actual and potential EU 
candidates are greater in comparison with other neighbors.  
 
So far, in spite of many alarming public comments (like that of the World Bank President 
Robert Zoellick on February 27, 2009
14
) there is no coherent action plan at the Union level 
on how to stop financial contagion from spreading across the EU periphery. Several ad hoc 
measures have been taken since October 2008, when the crisis started to hit emerging 
markets (see Darvas & Pisani-Ferry, 2008 who analyze some of these measures in respect 
to NMS). However, as in other policy areas, the shortage of fiscal resources at the EU level 
has limited the scale and effectiveness of anti-crisis measures. Formally, the EU co-
sponsored some country-specific rescue programs (in the cases of Hungary, Iceland and 
Latvia; the same will probably happen in respect to Romania) but most of resources came 
from either multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, or directly from the EU 
member states.  
 
One of the key questions which the core Eurozone members must answer is whether offering 
a fast-track EMU accession opportunity to countries that remain outside the common 
currency area (which could help revive market confidence and incentivize them to adjust 
policies) is a better solution than allowing them to continue sinking into market turmoil.  
 
The same question concerns increasing the speed of the EU accession process in the 
Western Balkan countries and Turkey. This which could potentially help the Western Balkans 
and Turkey in way that is similar a clearly defined EMU accession perspective encourages 
the current NMS to act.  
 
                                                 
14
 http://www.ft.com/cms/3cf2381c-c064-11dd-9559-000077b07658.html 
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9. Looking ahead: how to make future crisis management more 
effective?  
 
The European integration is not a completed project, both in terms of its content and 
geographical coverage. Actually, the EU represents a kind of institutional hybrid (subject to 
further evolution) based on asymmetric foundations, which cannot be easily attributed to a 
single institutional model such as a federation, confederation or international organization. 
Generally it has more prerogatives in the economic sphere than in the political one.  
 
The above mentioned asymmetry (or hybrid character) concerns even the Single European 
Market and Economic and Monetary Union, which constitute the main pillars of the EU 
economic architecture. Some prerogatives such as the external trade policy, the Common 
Agriculture Policy, and the competition policy are delegated to the supranational level while 
others (like financial supervision or fiscal policy) remain largely in the hands of national 
authorities.  
 
Although the financial services represent one of the most integrated parts of the European 
and global markets, they are supervised by national authorities and financial regulations are 
not fully harmonized across the EU. While a substantial part of the EU uses the common 
currency, the Union budget is limited to 1% of its GDP and finances only specific policies. So 
there is very limited room for a joint fiscal policy at the Union level. The list of institutional 
inconsistencies, and sometimes even contradictions, is a long one.  
 
Such an adverse shock as the current global financial crisis will serve as an important test 
which will measure the consistency and sustainability of the EU institutional architecture and 
common policies. It may either strengthen them and trigger further integration (by eliminating 
asymmetries and adding the lacking integration segments) or put the entire European project 
in reverse, by renationalizing certain policies. Without assuming which scenario is more likely 
to occur, the following dangers and challenges should be pointed out at this early stage of 
crisis development:  
 
1. The greatest danger is related to counter-cyclical fiscal policy conducted at the 
national level. This involves a great potential for protectionism or economic 
nationalism, which would easily destroy several segments of the Single European 
Market. It could also destroy the SGP and the fragile culture of budgetary constraints 
at the national level. Due to the crowding-out effect, it would further decrease the 
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available financing for both private sector and sovereign borrowing at the EU 
periphery. 
2. The same kind of danger comes from national rather than EU-wide rescue packages 
offered to the troubled financial institutions.  
3. The entire system of financial regulation and financial supervision requires a general 
overhaul both at the global and EU levels. The available blueprints, including the 
Larosiere Report, are moving in the right direction, but it remains unclear whether 
their recommendations will receive sufficient political support from national 
governments as they touch upon areas which are considered sensitive from the point 
of view of individual countries’ sovereignty.  
4. The crisis renewed the sharp divide between the “core” Western European 
economies and the Central, East and South European “periphery”. The latter have 
been particularly affected by the crisis. The response to this quite unexpected 
challenge will verify earlier, optimistic market perceptions of the potential cross-
country solidarity within the EU. It could either speed up horizontal/geographical 
integration in Europe by bringing more countries to the EMU and EU enlargement 
processes, or draw new dividing lines between the “core” and the “periphery” and 
“multi-speed Europe”.  
 
One of the first lessons offered by the crisis is the necessity to increase, at least temporarily, 
the EU’s fiscal potential, which would allow providing rescue packages to both troubled 
financial institutions and member states in a coordinated way. This may be done by 
authorizing the European Commission to borrow on behalf of member states for the above 
mentioned purposes and create a kind of emergency fund. In addition, the EU must work to 
complete the lacking elements of the Single European Market architecture such as the 
European System of Financial Supervision.  
 
The recent crisis has also revealed several other institutional dilemmas, for example, 
whether the system of a rotating EU Presidency guarantees an effective response to 
unexpected shocks, taking into consideration its short-term horizon (half year), the unequal 
capacities of individual member states to address global and pan-European issues, and the 
various national interests and policies of member states.  
Going beyond the EU borders, both the Union itself and its member states must be ready to 
coordinate their policies in many important areas (financial regulation and supervision, 
monetary policy, fiscal policy, trade policy, etc.) with other major partners in both the 
developed and developing world, and transfer some of their sovereignty to the global 
institutions if needed.  
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